

THE RICHMOND DISPATCH
BY THE DISPATCH COMPANY.

The DAILY DISPATCH is delivered to subscribers at \$1.00 per week, payable in advance. It is published every day except on Sundays and public holidays. The price of the paper is \$1.00 per week, \$5.00 per month, \$15.00 per quarter, \$50.00 per annum, in advance. The price of the paper is \$1.00 per week, \$5.00 per month, \$15.00 per quarter, \$50.00 per annum, in advance. The price of the paper is \$1.00 per week, \$5.00 per month, \$15.00 per quarter, \$50.00 per annum, in advance.

Advertisements are taken at the rate of \$1.00 per line for the first week, and \$0.50 for each subsequent week. The price of the paper is \$1.00 per week, \$5.00 per month, \$15.00 per quarter, \$50.00 per annum, in advance. The price of the paper is \$1.00 per week, \$5.00 per month, \$15.00 per quarter, \$50.00 per annum, in advance.

TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1885.

Line upon Line.
Letters we have received make it proper for us to say again that all the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States rendered last week were negative in their character. No decision has been rendered which makes it the duty of any collector of taxes or of any other State officer to receive coupons for taxes. The decisions went as far as any United States court will ever go, yet they went only so far as to say that if the tax-payer tendered coupons in payment of his taxes, the collecting officers could not refuse to accept them.

Let us repeat what we said upon this point last week:
1. There is no law under which coupons can be presented at the treasury for redemption. All the talk about rushing coupons into the treasury is based upon a mistaken idea, or is careless talk.

2. There is no decision of any court, Federal or State, under which coupons can be redeemed at the treasury.
3. Not one dollar of coupons can ever get into the treasury unless voluntarily paid to some collecting officer by a tax-payer.

Now, we will add that the coupons must be genuine, just as the gold or silver coins, or greenbacks, or banknotes, must be genuine. When the court says that a tender of coupons relieves the tax-payer from liability to levy, it means as to coupons just what it would mean as to banknotes; just that a tender of banknotes relieves the tax-payer from liability to levy. In other words, the coupons, greenbacks, banknotes, or gold or silver coins, must be genuine. Read Mr. Justice MATTHEWS' words as taken down by our own reporter:

"As we have seen, the coupon-holder WHO HAS TENDERED GENUINE COUPONS and has been refused, stands on the same basis in this respect as if he had tendered gold coin with a like result."

A correspondent, who says that our leader of last Saturday expressed very clearly the duty of all patriotic tax-payers, adds that before the late decisions of the United States Supreme Court, there were corporations and wealthy citizens who availed themselves of the privilege to tender coupons in payment of their taxes, and says that to him, under the decision of the court referred to, it would appear that they now can do so without any sort of hindrance whatever.

Of course this is a misunderstanding. The Auditor will require all collecting officers to receive none but genuine coupons. If counterfeit ones are received either at the treasury or by the collecting officers the party or parties receiving them will be the loser.

We must repeat that the RIDDLERBERGER bill was not touched by the late decisions of the Supreme Court. The bondholders, if they are wise, will proceed at once to fund under that bill.

But it is said that the whole of the act of January 26, 1882, and of the amendatory act of March 14, 1884, has been pronounced unconstitutional. True enough; but that decision merely returns the State to her natural rights. She has now no law prescribing a method of proving coupons to be genuine. Nor has she any law prescribing a method of proving banknotes, or greenbacks, or gold or silver coins, to be genuine. But she has the right—unquestionable right—to reject all coupons, all banknotes, all greenbacks, all gold or silver coins, which are not genuine. Every county treasurer who comes to Richmond to settle with the Auditor must bring either genuine money or genuine coupons.

But above all is the indisputable fact that not one dollar of coupons can get into the treasury unless paid in voluntarily by some tax-payer. If the people of Virginia desire to be rid of the debt question—if they wish to have all the outstanding bonds funded under the RIDDLERBERGER bill—all they have to do is to persist for one or two more years in paying their taxes in money. The State is obliged to have money, and if you pay in coupons you will lose as much in the end as you will gain in the beginning.

The State, let us say once more, is still master of the situation.

Bradstreet's is a cautious paper. In its last issue it very modestly says as to the decisions in the Virginia cases: "The doctrine now held by the court appears to be in substance that while the State of Virginia has made a valid contract with the coupon-holders, yet that the Federal courts have no power to interfere aggressively to compel the performance by the State of its contract, though the power of those courts can be interposed to defend the other contracting party (the coupon-holder) against compulsory process of the State,

after he has performed the contract on his part. These late decisions will, therefore, afford some degree of protection to the bondholders, and will give at least a negative value to the coupons."

Why couldn't JOHN A. HAMILTON & Co. see as clear as Bradstreet's? "Negative value" is good. "Some degree of protection," quoths!

Shameful Misrepresentation.
The articles in the New York Tribune on the Virginia debt question are a disgrace to journalism. Here, for example, is one of its downright falsehoods. That paper says:

"The latest scheme of the Bourbons is to call a State convention, and solemnly resolve the old State out of existence, leaving no corporate entity to be responsible for the payment of any bonds or interest thereon."

But the question would even then arise whether Virginia, or any new organization of the same material, could claim any of the rights and powers of the State. If it is a State at all, it is Virginia, and has a debt; if it is not the State of Virginia, it is entitled to no representation in the Electoral College, in the Senate, or in the House.

The above is a falsehood having not a shadow of foundation. Nobody in Virginia has ever proposed so absurd a scheme. The Tribune cannot, to save its reputation for veracity, cite the authority of any Virginian or Virginia paper for its false statement. It was based, of course, upon the proposition to assess the State taxes upon the counties instead of upon property. But surely anybody not an idiot can understand that in order to the success of this scheme, (which we have not endorsed,) there must be a State government to enforce it—a Governor, a Legislature, a judiciary, and all other needed State officers. It would require a strong State government to carry out that scheme.

But the Tribune is letting out its malice. It seeks to arouse northern prejudice against the Democratic Administration by denouncing the people of Virginia as repudiators. Here is a specimen of that paper's decency:

"Virginia, however, will be obliged to recognize the fact that the law is no respecter of persons, and the Constitution of the United States cannot be set aside with impunity, even by the first families of Virginia."

"In some fashion, however, the Bourbons intend to resist the authority of the United States, if they can. Next, the President will have to decide whether he will encourage and countenance those who defy the Constitution of the United States by appointing any of them to office. Men can be found in Virginia to hold all the offices who are staunch and uncompromising debt-payers. The President will either choose such men in any future appointments for Virginia, or he will make the cause of the repudiators his own."

That is enough. It is disgusting. It tells just what Republican journalism in New York is. The people of Virginia claim the protection of the Federal Constitution, quoting its emphatic provision that no State shall be sued as Virginia has been sued, and the above tirade is the Tribune's answer to that appeal. The slang of the street is substituted for the argument of the journalist.

But think of a Republican journal talking about appointing to office "staunch and uncompromising debt-payers"! MAHONEY and ARTHUR filled the Federal offices in Virginia with friends of the coupon-killing bill which the Tribune is now denouncing!

But it is useless to expect justice to any southern State or southern Democrat at the hands of JAY GOULD'S organ. It belongs to Wall street, and is, therefore, but a toothless hag. It cannot bite anybody.

College Athletics.
The Philadelphia Evening Telegraph, in an article commending the systematic course of gymnastic training given at one of the institutions of learning of Pennsylvania, says that "mind and body are, indeed, so interdependent that it is folly to expect to administer to one unless the best care is taken of the other. And," it adds, "in like manner it is folly to allow young people to indulge in violent exercise without the control of matured and skilled judgment. The haphazard work of the gymnasium has done more harm than good." True, and the students and authorities of our colleges and universities would do well to heed the above points. The time from now until commencement is the season in which students generally put in some of their heaviest athletic work, and it behooves college authorities to do everything in their power to see that this work is conducted systematically and not under too great a strain. Even though a college professor may not be competent to outline a proper course of training, if he be popular in his presence on the ball-field, in the gymnasium, or at the rowing reach will exercise a salutary influence. While many young men have been built up by college athletics, many have been ruined by them. In fact, it generally happens that the strongest men physically are the most indiscreet and most liable, if not checked, to over-exertion. It is a good rule for both professors and students to watch the "brag-men" especially.

One of the consequences of the decision as rendered by the majority of the court is that West Virginia will be held liable for one third of the original bonded debt of the old Commonwealth, as she was then a part and parcel of Virginia.—Louisville Post.

Oh, no. West Virginia has nothing to do with the decision. The court has decided nothing as to Virginia bonds, nor as to the State debt proper. We can repudiate those bonds or this debt whenever we please. The decision was simply that if a tax-payer had tendered coupons in payment of his taxes, the collecting officer could not afterwards levy upon his property to satisfy that particular tax. The United States Supreme Court does not pretend to claim the power to compel a State to pay its debts, though JAY GOULD'S organ seems to think it does.

His present publishers print his name on the title-page of his books, without so much as an intermediary comma, "Alfred Lord Tennyson." It is safe to surmise that Alfred Lord is writing

the alleged poems recently and cruelly attributed to Tennyson.—New York World.

"A true bill, my Lord."

Misunderstandings.
Although in 1881 the nominees for Governor and Attorney-General were both taken from the south side of the James river, there is still a prevalent impression in that grand division of the State that the Democrats there have habitually been slighted. We publish this morning a letter from Mr. ATKINS on that subject. We published last week a similar complaint from the Southwest. We have also published one of a somewhat similar nature from the Valley (Serench district). People almost unavoidably look at every such matter from their own point of view, and seldom follow CHARLES READE'S advice, "Put yourself in his place."

Therefore, we publish Mr. ATKINS' and other such letters. It is indispensable necessary that there should be a perfect understanding (instead of misunderstandings) between the Democrats of the various sections of Virginia, and we can think of no other method of accomplishing that end more likely to succeed as the policy of letting each section know what the other sections consider their grievances. We are bound to own that Mr. ATKINS makes out a strong case; and yet the strong letter of "Candor," which we also publish to-day, comes from a county adjoining Mr. ATKINS'.

BRIEF COMMENT.

The Canadian troops have had some RIFLE fighting, and do not think there is so much fun in the campaign after all.

The disposition of the press is to take Chaplain PEPPER'S story of his alleged interview with General LEE with a good deal of salt.

Louisville, according to the newspapers, has had a shower of "angle worms." That must be a pretty "bad form of 'em to have."

Senator SHERMAN reiterates his intention not to run for any office now. JOHN evidently knows that the country has had enough of him.

Senator SHERMAN, says a telegram to the Philadelphia Press, is willing to leave political life. Senator SHERMAN has the public's permission to do so.

There are signs of a dissolution of the senatorial deadlock in Illinois. "Dissolution of the deadlock" is good. Three or four members of the Legislature have died.

"Two bruisers are to spar for the benefit of the BARTHOLOMEW." Why not? Does not the World maintain that it is the duty of every one to "spar" for that object?

Our Correspondent and the Office.
SOUTH BOSTON, ILLINOIS, APRIL 25, 1885.

To the Editor of the Dispatch:
The writer has read with close attention the criticisms of the press upon the recent conferences of our congressmen, who met to consider the disposition of Federal offices, and also with much interest the many communications appearing in your paper from various portions of the State relative to that matter. But I feel impelled almost by a sense of duty to take issue with the assailants (the words used in no harsh sense) of our representatives, and especially because I have looked in vain for replies to some very harsh and unjust criticisms. I trust you will extend "the other side" an opportunity to be heard.

In the inception of this discussion it appeared to me singular, to say the least, that such extreme views of the action of our representatives should be entertained by so many of our party leaders. I hold to that opinion still; for, with all due respect to those who disagree with me, no sound reason has yet been advanced to justify the attacks or to prove our congressmen acting beyond their authority and without ample license. Nay, further, it does not appear that they have overstepped in the least the bounds of prudence or discretion.

The question of "spoils," vulgarly so styled, is one of the most difficult of management that confronts a newly victorious party. It is one which the astute politician has found to be ever pregnant with dangers to his success and honeycombed with pitfalls for his hopes. A congressman in appointing a constituent to an office for which twenty constituents apply generally gains one friend and enjoys the blissful firmness of having made nineteen very firm and very lively enemies. This is doubly true. None gainsay it. It is manifest, therefore, that the most mediocre of our statesmen must at once see the danger presented to individual ambition and therefore greatly prefer relief and freedom from these demands upon his official position and influence as an aid in securing Government employment. All do see it, and the majority would gladly avoid the responsibility of endorsing applications for such offices. They would not do so, however, by which you and the wisest of your people. I can't point but one of you to the same office, and as you and your representatives are not united among themselves there is no use for me to further divide you by appointing one against all the others, and thus offend the multitude. I will let the present incumbent hold on. And how was it possible for all the eight members to sign for more than one person for the same office without justifying themselves and destroying their own credit? It was possible for the members to have made their applications effective for any one applicant if they had been divided themselves among a half dozen or more candidates for the same position? Suppose, for instance, that each member had signed singly for an applicant from each district for the same office, how would the President have decided such a case? He would have said at once: "Gentlemen, you are divided radically among yourselves and are unable to give them a majority of the board. 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